公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。

Corporate Governance and IPO Underpricing:Evidences from Chinese Stock Market

According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency cost is the difference between the intrinsic value and price the investors want to pay when the firm sells part of shares to the investors, which to some extent is part of IPO underpicing. In the agency theory framework, the good corporate governance can help lower the agency cost in the IPO, i. e. , IPO underpricing. This paper analyzes the effects of the characteristics of corporate governance on IPO underpricing and finds that ownership pyramid and nature of related party transactions have significant effects on the IPO underpricng, but not for the characteristics of board. The implication of this paper is that the improvement of corporate governance will lower the IPO underpricing and cost of equity financing in stock market.