一事一议财政奖补制度对农村居民收入影响效应研究——基于中国县域面板数据的实证检验

一事一议财政奖补制度是中国农村税费改革后村级公共产品主要供给制度。该制度以其筹补结合的供给方式,弥补了由于税费减免导致的财政资金短缺加之村民筹资不足带来的村级公共产品供给缺失,有效促进了村级公共产品供给。理论上村级公共产品有效供给能够提高农村居民收入水平,但通过一事一议财政奖补制度提供的村级供给产品需要农民、村集体承担一部分建设费用,且后期管护工作在一定程度上增加了农民的经济负担。那么实施多年的一事一议财政奖补制度是否真正提高了农村居民收入水平？以及这种影响是短暂的还是持久的？其内在作用机制又是怎样的呢？文章首先从理论上分析一事一议财政奖补制度实施对农村居民收入的影响,并探讨"一事一议财政奖补→常住人口城镇化率→农村居民收入水平"的作用路径。然后运用中国县域面板数据对理论分析结论进行实证检验。文章在搜集2002年-2015年全国1869个县域经济数据基础上,从各省政府、省农委历年相关工作文件中查找1869个县开展一事一议财政奖补制度起始年份,最终形成26166组县域面板数据。研究发现,一事一议财政奖补制度实施能够对农村居民收入水平产生显著的正向影响,并且影响程度总体上呈现逐年递增趋势,并探讨常住人口城镇化率在其中发挥的中介效应。

Research on the Income Effect of “One Decision for Each Project” on Financial Rewards and Subsidies: Empirical Test Based on County Panel Data in China

"One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies is the main supply system of village-level public goods after the Rural Tax Reform in China. This system makes up for the shortage of financial funds due to the reduction of taxes and fees and the lack of village level public product supply due to the lack of villagers' financing, which effectively promotes the supply of village-level public products. There are so many factors that can affect the rural residents' income level. The supply level of rural public goods has attracted widespread attention of scholars, such as agricultural research, irrigation, rural education and infrastructure construction including roads, electricity and so on. All these have played a positive role in promoting the rural residents' income level. However, the village public goods, as a part of rural public goods haven't received widespread attention. "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies is a major institutional innovation with Chinese characteristics. In theory, the effective supply of village-level public goods can improve the rural residents' income level, but in the process of implementing the "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies, farmers and village collectives are required to bear part of the construction costs, and the latter management work to a certain extent increases the economic burden of farmers. Has the implementation of "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies for many years really improved the rural residents' income level? And is the impact temporary or lasting? Finally, what is the mechanism of its internal action? Few papers have carried out large sample empirical research on this issue. This study first theoretically analyzes the impact of the implementation of "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies on the income of rural residents, and discusses the path of its economic impact:"One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies → urbanization rate of permanent residents → income level of rural residents. Then we use the county panel data to test the theoretical analysis results. On the basis of collecting the county economic data of 1869 counties in China from 2002 to 2015, then we look for 1869 counties' information from the relevant working papers of provincial governments and provincial agricultural committees in the past years for the start years of "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies. At the end of collecting, this study formed 26166 groups of county panel data for empirical test. Difference-in-difference model is used to verify that the implementation of "One decision for each project" on financial rewards and subsidies can have a long-term and sustained positive impact on the rural residents' income level, and the impact degree shows an increasing trend year by year. And in our paper, we also discuss the mediation effect of urbanization rate.