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Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics, Yokohama National University, 79-3 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan;2. Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1 Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-0180, Japan;1. Bilkent University, Department of Economics, 06800 Çankaya, Ankara, Turkey;2. CESifo, Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany;3. Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, 31905 Haifa, Israel;1. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Edmond J. Safra Campus, Givat Ram, 91904 Jerusalem, Israel;2. Université Paris 2, LEMMA, 4, rue Blaise Desgoffe, 75006 Paris, France;1. Decision Sciences and MIS, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA 19104, United States;2. RUTCOR (Center for Operations Research), Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ 08854, United States |
| Abstract: | Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of a good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (MAX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (MIN) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of the good.GSP and MAX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and MIN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good.Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions. |
| Keywords: | Cost sharing Mechanism design Group strategyproof Tie-breaking rule |
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