Corruption in agricultural processing firms: A comparison of cooperatives and investor-owned firms |
| |
Authors: | Murray E Fulton Konstantinos Giannakas |
| |
Institution: | 1. Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada;2. Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Lincoln, Nebraska |
| |
Abstract: | This paper examines managerial corruption in cooperatives (co-ops) and investor-owned firms (IOFs), including its impact on prices and farmer welfare. Even when co-op managers have greater incentives to engage in corruption because of the co-op's larger production, the resulting corruption is not sufficient to offset the competitive effect that co-ops exert vis-à-vis IOFs. This conclusion holds regardless of the functional form of the production function, the farm input supply curve, and the demand curve for the processed product. In addition to showing the robustness of the competition effect, the paper provides a highly flexible modeling framework that can be used to examine other co-op behavior questions. |
| |
Keywords: | cooperatives corruption investor-owned firms mixed oligopsony |
|
|