Strategic nonlinear pricing |
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| Authors: | Farid Gasmi Michel Moreaux William Sharkey |
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| Affiliation: | (1) Present address: Institut D'Economie Industrielle, Université de Toulouse I, Place Anatole France, F-31042 Toulouse, France;(2) Present address: Institut D'Economie Industrielle, LERNA-INRA and IUF, Université de Toulouse I, Place Anatole France, F-31042 Toulouse, France;(3) Present address: Federal Communications Commission, Portals II, 445 12th Street, 20554 Washington, D.C., USA |
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| Abstract: | The objective of this paper is to examine the role of nonlinear strategies in a standard oligopoly framework. We demonstrate that nonlinear pricing may indeed emerge as an equilibrium strategy, but only when firms produce differentiated products, when one firm retains market power due to a cost advantage, or as part of an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In addition, we examine the role of nonlinear pricing in a spatial-competition framework. Our main conclusion is that in highly competitive markets, nonlinear pricing strategies are not likely to emerge as an equilibrium. |
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| Keywords: | nonlinear pricing two-part tariffs oligopoly spatial competition |
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