An empirical study of voluntary transfer pricing disclosures in China |
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| Authors: | Agnes WY Lo Raymond MK Wong |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Accountancy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong;2. Department of Accountancy, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;1. Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China;2. Institute of Accounting and Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, China;3. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, China;4. SILC Business School, Shanghai University, China;1. School of Business, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia;2. School of Business, Western Sydney University, Sydney, Australia;3. College of Economics, Shenzhen University, 3688 Nan Hai Street, Nanshan District, Shenzhen 518060, Guangdong, China;1. School of Accounting, Curtin Business School, Curtin University, GPO Box U1987, Perth 6845, Western Australia, Australia;2. Discipline of Accounting and Information Systems, Business School, The University of Adelaide, 10 Pulteney Street, Adelaide 5005, South Australia, Australia |
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| Abstract: | This paper empirically investigates the factors that affect the management’s voluntary disclosures of the transfer pricing details of related-party transactions. Using Chinese data from 2004 and 2005, we hypothesize and find that firms that make voluntary disclosures of the pricing methods of related-party transactions are negatively associated with (i) a higher level of earnings management (as captured by abnormal related-party transactions) and (ii) its underlying incentives (as captured by the management’s performance-linked bonuses and the firm’s incentives to achieve earnings targets); further, they are positively associated with (i) a higher percentage of independent directors and (ii) a higher percentage of government ownership. Overall, our findings suggest that earnings management and its incentives, board composition, and ownership structure significantly influence the voluntary disclosure decisions of managers. |
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