业绩预告下的股份减持与内幕交易——会计稳健性是遏制还是助力？

选取2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察业绩预告发布前后大股东是否存在以及如何利用自身信息优势进行股份减持交易,会计稳健性是否以及如何对该内幕交易产生影响。研究结果表明:与强制性业绩预告相比,自愿性业绩预告披露前后发生大股东减持的概率更高,并且会计稳健性会显著抑制自愿性业绩预告披露前后的大股东减持行为。进一步将业绩预告消息区分为好消息和坏消息之后研究发现:坏消息的利空程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之前进行股份减持的规模越大;或者好消息的利好程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之后减持的规模也越大;稳健的财务信息能够抑制公司在隐匿坏消息方面进行的内幕交易,但会加剧公司在隐匿好消息方面进行的内幕交易。

Shares Reduction and Insider Trading Based on the Earnings Forecasts:Is Accounting Conservatism Containment or Assistance?

The forms of insider trading in China's capital market are various and covert,among which,it is one of the common means for the major shareholders'selling of original non-tradable shares by using the opportunity of earnings forecasts.In this paper,we take the major shareholders'selling events near the disclosure of earnings forecasts of listed companies as the research object.The results show that,compared with the mandatory earnings forecasts,voluntary earnings forecasts is more likely to become a channel for the major shareholders to make use of information advantages to sell their holdings at the right time,and accounting conservatism can significantly negatively affect the insider trading behavior of the major shareholders.This article further divides earnings forecasts news into good news and bad news,and finds that,before the disclosure of earnings forecasts,the worse the bad news,the more the big shareholders reduce their non-tradable shares;or after the disclosure of earnings forecasts,the better the good news,the more the big shareholders reduce their non-tradable shares.It can be seen that more robust financial information can restrain insider trading in concealing bad news,but can aggravate insider trading in hiding good news.