具有奖励机制与再保险安排的最优保险合约设计

在保险合约中引入奖励机制可以使投保人动态参与到保险合约中,赋予了投保人在面对索赔事件时是否执行索赔的可选择权,改变了传统保险合约中投保人执行索赔的单一权利,但却增加了保险人潜在的流动性风险。保险合约中再保险的安排则可以对冲由于奖励机制产生的潜在流动性风险,进一步分散保险人的风险,有助于保险人稳健经营。基于此,通过建立具有红利奖励机制与再保险安排的最优保险合约设计模型,最终求解得到最优保险合约是具有最优免赔额形式的保险合约。利用算例研究方法进行建模,研究结果显示,最优保险合约中的最优免赔额与奖励机制中的红利奖励之间具有正向关系,保费、自留额与最优免赔额之间则存在着显著的负向关系。

Optimal Insurance Contract Design in the Present of Incentive Mechanism and Reinsurance Arrangements

Adding incentive mechanism in an insurance contract can make policy holder participate in the insurance contract dynamically. It gives policy holder the option of whether to execute a claim when facing claimant events, which changes the single right of policy holder to execute claims in traditional insurance contracts. Meanwhile, it increases the potential liquidity risk of the insurer. The reinsurance arrangement in the insurance contract further disperses the risk of the insurer and helps the insurer to operate steadily. Based on this, this paper establishes an optimal insurance contract design model with dividend incentive mechanism and reinsurance arrangement, finding that the optimal insurance contract is an insurance contract with the optimal form of being deductible. The results show that there is a positive relationship between the optimal deductible and the dividend incentive in the incentive mechanism, and a significant negative relationship between the premium, retention and the optimal deductible.