参与式预算行为实验研究

本文介绍了序贯的讨价还价理论,并通过分析企业参与式预算活动与讨价还价行为的相似性,利用讨价还价模型,构建了本实验的基本模型。依据序贯理论研究参与式预算活动,设定了国有企业与民营企业背景下管理者角色的支付函数,与传统预算激励制度相比,对下属实行真实导向的预算激励制度时,会产生更高的预算值和更低的预算松弛,且预算成本小、效率高。

Experiment Research on the Behavior of Participative Budget

This article introduces the theory of sequential bargains,and by analysing the similarities between participative budgets of enterprises with bargaining behaviors,the article constructs the basic model of the experiment by taking advantage of the bargain model.Based on the theory of sequential bargains,it researches on participative budget and establishes the payment function for the superintendent role under the background of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.comparing with the traditional budget drive system,the budget drive system with real guidance can have a higher budget value and lower budget relaxation when implemented to subordinates,with a smaller budget cost and higher efficiency.