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国有企业的出售机制:拍卖
引用本文:徐雪霞,全登华.国有企业的出售机制:拍卖[J].商业研究,2005(20):143-146.
作者姓名:徐雪霞  全登华
作者单位:1. 武汉科技学院,经济管理学院
2. 中山大学,管理学院,湖北,武汉,430073
摘    要:目前国有企业的出售机制大多采用管理层收购,并且在具体实施中大多采用政府与企业的在任管理层双方非公开议价的方式进行。收购过程不透明,且收购价格过低,这是人们对管理层收购的两大质疑之处。允许管理层参加拍卖是解决这两方面问题的有效途径。因此,拍卖是国有企业的最优出售机制。考察了四种标准拍卖方式在各种环境下的效率,以及不同拍卖方式对政府出售企业收入的影响,并确定最优拍卖。

关 键 词:拍卖  拍卖形式  基本模型  最优拍卖
文章编号:1001-148X(2005)20-0143-04
收稿时间:09 10 2004 12:00AM
修稿时间:2004年9月10日

Auction: the Machanism Selling State- owned Enterprises
XU Xue-xia,QUAN Deng-hua.Auction: the Machanism Selling State- owned Enterprises[J].Commercial Research,2005(20):143-146.
Authors:XU Xue-xia  QUAN Deng-hua
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Wuhan Institute of Science and Technology, Wuhan, Hubei 430073, China ; 2. School of Management, Zhongshan University, Wuhan , Hubei 430073, China
Abstract:Currently MBO is a mostly common method of selling mechanism for state - owned enterprises. In practice, nonpublic negotiation is often adopted between the management of both government and enterprises. The purchase process is not open enough and often at very low price, which leads to public confusions with MBO. It is assumed that the aufion with the participation of the management would be an effective solution to those problems. Auction is the optimum selling mechanism for state - owned enterprises. The paper finds the optimum auction by investigating the efficiency of four different standard auctions in different environment and their effects on government.
Keywords:auction  auction formalities  basic model  optimum auction
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