Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading |
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| Institution: | 1. International Center of Management Science and Engineering, School of Management and Engineering, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210093, China;2. Department of Management Sciences, City University of Hong Kong, Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong;1. Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;2. School of Computer and Control Engineering, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China |
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| Abstract: | This paper aims to propose multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain trading (PSCT). We first construct a multi-unit/single-unit multi-attribute double auction (MS-MDA) for PSCT where suppliers can submit bids on a single unit of one item (i.e., single output restriction). We then relax the single output restriction and propose a multi-unit multi-attribute double auction (M-MDA) for PSCT in which each supplier offers multiple units of one item. Both the MS-MDA and M-MDA mechanisms are incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced and computationally efficient. The computational study shows that all proposed mechanisms are of high allocation efficiency and practically implementable. |
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| Keywords: | Mechanism design Multi-attribute double auctions Perishable supply chain trading Incentive compatibility |
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