首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

多元化、管理层激励与企业绩效──基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证检验
引用本文:沈梁军,刘林.多元化、管理层激励与企业绩效──基于中国上市公司面板数据的实证检验[J].改革与战略,2010,26(6):54-57,115.
作者姓名:沈梁军  刘林
作者单位:1. 北京大学光华管理学院,北京,100871
2. 中国石油大学工商管理学院,北京,102249
摘    要:文章在参考企业多元化的代理理论文献研究基础上,首先在分析计量模型中控制了管理层激励对公司多元化战略的影响,避免了遗漏变量对估计的影响,其次,采用了面板数据的固定效应模型来估计多元化折价效应,进一步控制企业异质性的影响。计量模型结果显示企业绩效与多元化负相关,与管理层激励正相关。

关 键 词:多元化折价  管理层激励  企业绩效  固定效应模型

Diversification, Top Managers' Incentive and Firm Performance——An Empirical Test Based on Panel Data of the Listed Chinese Companies
Shen Liangjun,Liu Lin.Diversification, Top Managers' Incentive and Firm Performance——An Empirical Test Based on Panel Data of the Listed Chinese Companies[J].Reformation & Strategy,2010,26(6):54-57,115.
Authors:Shen Liangjun  Liu Lin
Institution:1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871; 2. School of Business Administration, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249)
Abstract:Based on the literature of agency theory explanation for firm, this paper tries to promote our understanding on the diversification of the listed Chinese companies in two ways. First, taking control of the top manager's incentive impacts, this paper prevents the omitted variable problem in the empirical model. Second, this paper uses the fixed effect model of panel data to estimate diversification discount, so that this paper also controls the firms' heterogeneity problem. This paper's empirical results suggest that the firm's value has a negative relation to firm's diversification, but has a positive relation to top managers' incentive
Keywords:diversification discount  top managers’ incentive  firm value  fixed effect model
本文献已被 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号