| 我国健康保险反欺诈的博弈分析及其政策建议 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐徐,茅利敏. 我国健康保险反欺诈的博弈分析及其政策建议[J]. 技术经济与管理研究, 2009, 0(3): 87-89 |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐徐 茅利敏 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京工商大学经济学院,北京,100048;中国机械工业成套工程总公司,北京,100044 |
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| 摘 要： | 在健康保险领域,由于信息不对称导致的保险欺诈问题已成为影响我国保险业健康发展的毒瘤。本文运用博弈论的相关知识对健康保险欺诈问题进行分析,找出影响保险欺诈成本支出的主要因素,再运用最优化方法分析,提出建立有效的健康保险反欺诈机制的政策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 健康保险 反欺诈 博弈 差额赔付 监督成本 |
Game Analysis on Anti-fraud of Health Insurance in China |
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| XU Xu,MAO Li-min. Game Analysis on Anti-fraud of Health Insurance in China[J]. Technoeconomics & Management Research, 2009, 0(3): 87-89 |
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| Authors: | XU Xu MAO Li-min |
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| Affiliation: | XU Xu, MAO Li-min |
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| Abstract: | Health insurance fraud due to asymmetric information has been the obstacle to China's insurance industry development.This paper analyzes health insurance fraud base on the game theory and finds main factors bringing insurance fraud costs.And it gives some suggestions to establish an effective anti-fraud mechanism for health insurance. |
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| Keywords: | Health Insurance Anti-fraud Game Theory Difference between Payments Regulatory Cost |
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