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逆向选择、信用担保与银行信贷契约设计
引用本文:俞兆云,陈飞翔.逆向选择、信用担保与银行信贷契约设计[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2010(1).
作者姓名:俞兆云  陈飞翔
作者单位:同济大学,经济与管理学院,上海,200092
摘    要:本文从引入第三方信用担保的角度,探讨防范中小企业信贷市场逆向选择发生的银行信贷契约设计问题.研究认为,在信息不对称的条件下,考虑到银行内部信贷治理机制因素,银行基层机构将对高风险中小企业实行高担保、高贷给率;对低风险中小企业实行低担保、低贷给率.另外,引入担保企业的前提条件是其能够有效缓解银行与中小企业问的信息不对称问题,在银行与中小企业之间起信息桥梁的作用,防范信贷市场逆向选择的发生.

关 键 词:逆向选择  信用担保  信贷契约设计

Adverse Selection,Credit Guarantee and Loan Contract Design
YU Zhao-yun,CHEN Fei-xiang.Adverse Selection,Credit Guarantee and Loan Contract Design[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2010(1).
Authors:YU Zhao-yun  CHEN Fei-xiang
Institution:YU Zhao-yun CHEN Fei-xiang(School of Economy , Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)
Abstract:Based on third-party credit guarantee,the paper discusses the loan contract design for SMEs credit financing to prevent the occurrence of adverse selection.The study suggests that,under the bank's internal credit management mechanism,the sub-branch of the bank will provide high-security and high loan ratio contract for high risk SMEs,and provide low-security and low loan ratio contract for low risk SMEs.The paper also points out that a prerequisite for the introduction of a guarantee company is that it's ab...
Keywords:Adverse Selection  Credit Guarantee  Loan Contract Design  
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