The <Emphasis Type="Italic">n</Emphasis>-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations |
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Authors: | S Nuray Akin Brennan C Platt Murat R Sertel |
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Institution: | (1) School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria, 3125, Australia |
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Abstract: | This study examines the behavior of simple n-person bargaining problems under pre-donations where the Kalai-Smorodinsky (KS) solution is operant. Pre- donations are a
unilateral commitment to transfer a portion of one’s utility to someone else, and are used to distort the bargaining set and
thereby influence the bargaining solution. In equilibrium, these pre-donations are Pareto-improving over the undistorted solution;
moreover, when the agents’ preferences are sufficiently distinct, the equilibrium solution coincides with the concessionary
division rule. |
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Keywords: | |
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