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控股股东、会计信息质量与企业非效率投资
引用本文:娄亚萍.控股股东、会计信息质量与企业非效率投资[J].广西财经学院学报,2012(3):82-88.
作者姓名:娄亚萍
作者单位:石河子大学经济管理学院,新疆石河子832000
摘    要:文章以中国资本市场 A 股上市公司为样本,考察了会计信息披露对信息不对称和代理冲突的缓解作用,实证检验了会计信息质量的提高对公司资本配置的影响.研究发现,会计信息质量的提高可以有效抑制企业的非效率投资行为,可以缓解上市公司控股股东代理冲突所带来的投资不足和投资过度,发挥一定的公司治理作用.稳健性检验表明,研究结论不依赖于变量的选取和衡量方法,具有较强的可靠性

关 键 词:控股股东  会计信息质量  过度投资  投资不足

Controlling Shareholders,Quality of Accounting Information and Corporate Non-efficient Investment
LOU Ya-ping.Controlling Shareholders,Quality of Accounting Information and Corporate Non-efficient Investment[J].JOURNAL OF GUANGXI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS,2012(3):82-88.
Authors:LOU Ya-ping
Institution:LOU Ya-ping(College of Economics and Management,Shi He Zi University,Shi He Zi 832000,China)
Abstract:This paper investigates the effect of accounting information disclosure on mitigation of information asymmetry and agency conflicts based on the case study of A-share listed companies in China capital market.It testifies the impact of improving accounting information on capital allocation.The result shows that higher accounting information quality can effectively inhibit non-efficient investment;and it can also alleviate the insufficient investment or excessive investment resulting from controlling shareholders agency conflicts of a listed company,and will play a certain role in accounting governance.The Robust test shows that the conclusion of this study is independent of selected variables and testing methods,thus has greater reliability.
Keywords:Controlling shareholders  the quality of accounting information  excessive investment  investment shortage
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