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Strategic complementarities and nested potential games
Authors:Hiroshi Uno
Institution:aInstitute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan
Abstract:This paper reports that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined by Uno Uno, H., 2007. Nested potential games. Economics Bulletin 3(17), 1–8] if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one player.
Keywords:Strategic complementarities  Potential games  Existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
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