A note on endogenous transfers

In a competitive and Walrasian stable world with two goods transfer paradoxes are very robust to endogenization (relating the size of the transfer to either the donor's or the recipient's GNP). Donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment occur in very general formulations of endogenization if and only if they occur in the model in which transfers are exogenous (as is usually assumed). Endogenization in practice will probably cause a dampening effect (smaller price and welfare changes than in the case of pure exogenous transfers).An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Econometric Society European Meeting in Munich, 1989, and EADI (European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes) in Oslo, 1990. We are grateful to an anonymous referee, Willem Buiter, Peter van Bergeijk, Richard Gigengack, Jan Pen, Georg Tillmann, Edward Towrr, and Casper de Vries for helpful comments.