The dynamics of responder behavior in ultimatum games: a meta-study |
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Authors: | David J Cooper E Glenn Dutcher |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, 1503 E University Blvd., Tucson, AZ 85721, USA |
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Abstract: | Using data aggregated from seven papers that study repeated play in standard ultimatum games with either stranger or absolute
stranger matching, we show that the behavior of responders changes with experience. High offers are more likely to be accepted
with experience and low offers are more likely to be rejected. At the individual level, there is a negative relationship between
the likelihood that a given offer is accepted and the size of the preceding offer. We compare the results with predictions
generated by static models of distributional preferences, implicitly dynamic models of preferences with reciprocity, and explicitly
dynamic models of adaptive learning. The data is most consistent with models of preferences with reciprocity. |
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Keywords: | |
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