世贸组织谈判与利益分配——一种非对称进化博弈论分析

本文分析了经典博弈论与进化博弈论的主要区别,引述了分析多群体非对称博弈的复制动态方程,并以此为工具求得了在世贸组织谈判中,发达国家与发展中国家之间利益分配的进化博弈解:谈判结局出现有利于发达国家的利益分配状况要远远多于有利于发展中国家的状况,最终发达国家能得到谈判议题可能产生的贸易利益的绝大部分。在此基础上,本文进一步分析了这一结论对于发展中国家的政策意义。

The Distribution of Benefits in WTO Negotiation

This paper analyzes the main differences between classic game theory and evolutionary game theory, quotes the replicator dynamics equation that can analyze polymorphic populations and asymmetry model. Based on the analysis, this paper considers, in most WTO negotiation, the ultima ending will be much more beneficial to the developed country than the developing country. And the author puts forward the policy that the developing country should adopt in WTO negotiation.