论国有商业银行的双重功能与不良资产的双重成因

国有商业银行所形成的巨额不良资产，需要从其事实上履行的双重功能入手进行解析：国有商业银行在履行基本功能时，由于行业性风险产生的不良资产具有普遍性和内生性；但其在履行公共性功能时。由于承担的政策性风险和支付的履职成本无法分摊导致的超额不良资产，具有特殊性和外生性。因此。降低国有商业银行的不良资产，既要控制行业性风险，更要建立对其履行特殊功能所支付成本的合理分摊机制，并随着市场机制作用的增强从体制上逐步淡化其特殊功能，从根本上解决由外生性原因造成的超额不良资产。

An Analysis on the Dual-Functions of SOCBs and the Dual-Causes of NPLs in China

While state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have contributed greatly to the economic and financial developments in China, a large number of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) have been accumulated due to the bugs of institutional arrangements and internal managements. The author suggests that the dual-functions (the basic function and the public function) of the SOCBs could be the major cause of the problem. When SOCBs performed the basic functions, as the productions of the industrial risks, the NPLs showed more common and endogenous style, but particular and exogenous style because of the policy risks and the un-shareable performing costs when SOCBs performed the public functions. Thus, to solve the NPLs, besides the construction of the market and the inter-control mechanism, the mechanism by which the performing costs of the public functions can be shared is the most important, and the public functions should no longer be taken by the SOCBs any more. Only in this way can the NPLs of the SOCBs be solved ultimately.