政府、环保部门、企业环保行为的动态博弈分析

本文首先建立了一个关于环保部门检查与不检查、企业治污与不治污、环保部门滥用职权与不滥用职权、企业行贿与不行贿的两方动态博弈模型,并将信誉机制引入模型,求出模型的均衡解。然后根据对均衡解的分析得出环保部门与企业之间容易产生寻租行为,由此提出政府对环保部门进行监督的重要性,并建立了政府与环保部门的动态博弈模型以及得出该模型的均衡解。最后通过对两个动态博弈模型均衡解的分析,提出了治理污染和保护环境的对策。

Dynamic Game Analysis about Environment protection behavior among Government、Environment protection department and Enterprise

First,this paper builds up a two-person dynamic game model between environment protectiondepartment and enterprise.The action profile includes environment protection department inspecting or not , enterpriseharnessing pollution or not , environment protection department abusing authority or not , enterprise bribing or not. Meanwhile reputation mechanism is introduced in the model and its equilibrium solution is got too .Then throughanalyzing this solution the paper shows it is easy to engender bribing between the two parts So it is necessary forgovernment to supervise. Furthermore the paper builds up another dynamic game model about government andenvironment protection department and gets its equilibrium solution. Last on the basis of the two models and theirequilibrium solutions, the paper puts forwards some treatments to harness pollution and protect environment.