Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly |
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Authors: | Michael Wohlgemuth |
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Institution: | (1) Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von Wirtschaftssystemen, Kahlaische Strasse 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany (e-mail: wohlgemuth@mpiew-jena.mpg.de), DE |
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Abstract: | An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations
of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly
and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete
contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the
same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers
to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will
be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking
long-term investments in basic political reforms. |
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Keywords: | : Schumpeter and public choice – Political entrepreneurs – Entry barriers – Policy reform – Political competition |
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