拆分招标的供应商数量研究

许多企业在采购时,常常将整笔业务拆分为两个合同:较大的第一合同和较小的第二合同,通过分批二级价格封闭式招标来选择不同的供应商供货。本文通过建立分批招标模型分析了供应商的投标策略和买方的采购策略,得出了当参加第一合同竞标的供应商数目和第二合同新引入的供应商数目满足一个不等式时,拆分招标的采购成本小于整体招标的采购成本,并且指出了拆分比例对拆分招标的采购成本的影响。

Research on the number of suppliers in split-award auctions

In many procurement practices, the buyer splits his requirement into two contracts and awards them to different suppliers. The primary contract and the secondary contract are awarded sequentially by using second-price auction. There are suppliers who participate the auction of primary contract. The existing of secondary contract can increase new suppliers of low capacity to participate it. We formulate a model of sequential split-award auction and prove that when and satisfied a certain inequation, the expected procurement cost of split-award auctions is less than that of sole-source auction. Further more, the optimal strategy on how to split the contract is discussed to help the buyer benefit more.