| 上市公司会计造假的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 申慧慧. 上市公司会计造假的博弈分析[J]. 山东工商学院学报, 2006, 20(2): 73-76,80 |
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| 作者姓名： | 申慧慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学,会计学院,武汉,430060 |
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| 摘 要： | 通过建立动态博弈论模型,研究管理者会计造假的动机,并在此基础上提出两种会计造假的解决方案:一是建立管理者和投资者的制衡机制;二是制定有效的市场监管和惩罚机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 博弈论 会计造假 纳什均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-5956（2006）02-0073-04 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-09-28 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-09-28 |
Game Analysis of Accounting Fraud Made by Listed Companies |
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| SHEN Hui-hui. Game Analysis of Accounting Fraud Made by Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Shandong Institute of Business and Technology, 2006, 20(2): 73-76,80 |
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| Authors: | SHEN Hui-hui |
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| Abstract: | This essay tries to study the intensions of accounting fraud by establishing dynamic models of game theory. On this basis, it proposes two methods to resolve the problem. One is to establish the equilibrium mechanism between managers and investors. The other is to establish the efficient mechanisms about market administration and punishment. |
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| Keywords: | game theory accounting fraud Nash equilibrium |
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