| Abstract: |
Voluntary export restraints have been a popular resort of industrialcountries faced with increasing competition from exports ofdeveloping countries. As a strategy for circumventing the rulesof the GATT (whose regulations preclude increases in tariffs),these nontariff barriers have been rather successful; whetherthey have been as successful in their aim of protecting andstimulating the industry concerned is another matter. This article looks at what happened when industrial countriesimposed—and then removed—voluntary export restraintson the footwear industry during the 1970s and 1980s. Why didprotectionism spread so fast and then dissipate almost as rapidly,and what effects did this coming and going have on the exportingcountries We suggest that industrial countries removed the restraintsbecause they found ?them either superfluous (the expected employmenteffect failed to materialize) or ineffective (the principalexporters maintained their market share during the height ofthe restrictions), or else because the industry was able toadjust by importing footwear at a profit. Predicting the effect of VERs, and determining how best to managethem, are critical questions for developing countries strugglingto improve their export performance in the 1990s. The resultsof detailed study of a representative industry, summarized here,may assist in the prediction and determination. |
