中国医疗系统的行为扭曲机理与过程分析

中国医疗系统中部分行为人 (医生及医院的各行政部门 )的行为扭曲现象(如医药合谋等 )相当普遍。运用多人合作博弈联盟理论 ,并结合委托代理理论对这一现象的产生机理和过程进行的研究发现 ,具有完全势力的政府的介入降低了医院这一N -人合作的正式组织的效率 ,并加剧了其内部的代理风险。这诱发并促成了医生和医院其他参与者各类扭曲行为的产生。正式组织的低效率也是以医药代表为组织协调人的非正式组织———医药合谋联盟广泛渗入到医疗体系中的根本原因。研究表明 ,中国现在推行的一些改革措施不能从根本上杜绝这类合谋行为的产生。

Study on the Mechanism of Behavioral Distortion in China''''s Medical System

In China's current medical system, it is a common practice for some players (such as doctors and administrative departments of hospitals) to deviate from their normal behavioral mode (for example, they collude with the pharmaceutical representatives). Aiming at opening out the rationale of such aberrant behaviors and based on the N-player Game Theory and the Principal-Agent Theory, the research shows that it is the absolute control of the government in the game that deduces the efficiency of hospitals (defined as the formal organizations of N-player coalition) and aggravates the risk of principal-agent in hospitals. Inefficiency of hospitals induces and causes aberrant behavior and should account for the invasion of the medical-drug collusions (defined as the informal organization into the medical system). Furthermore, we prove that some of the reforms in practice are unable to eradicate the collusions.