高管薪酬粘性、风险承担与企业投资效率——管理者权力与融资约束的调节作用

本文选取2010―2019年中国A股上市公司数据,实证分析了高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的影响及其作用机制。研究表明:(1)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率具有负向影响,会加剧企业过度投资,由此加大非效率投资及降低投资效率。(2)高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响仅对“奖优-低惩劣”薪酬契约有效。相对于非国有、高估值与制造业企业,高管薪酬粘性对国有、低估值与非制造业企业投资效率的负向影响更为显著。(3)管理者权力的提高会加剧高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,加剧高管权力寻租引发的薪酬补偿效应,由此稀释薪酬奖惩对业绩变动的敏感度。融资约束程度的提高会减弱高管薪酬粘性对企业投资效率的负向影响,这种负向影响主要针对投资不足企业,对过度投资企业不显著。(4)风险承担在高管薪酬粘性与企业投资效率的关系中承担着中介作用,高管薪酬粘性通过影响企业风险承担来影响企业投资效率,“高管薪酬粘性-风险承担-企业投资效率”的传导渠道有效。

Executive Compensation Stickiness,Risk-Taking and Corporate Investment Efficiency:the Regulating Effect of Management Power and Financing Constraints

This paper conducts an empirical analysis on influence of executive compensation stickiness on corporate investment efficiency and the underlying mechanism by using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019.The result shows that:(1)Executive compensation stickiness is negatively related to corporate investment efficiency.Executive compensation stickiness will exacerbate over-investment,thereby increasing inefficient investments and reducing investment efficiency.(2)The negative impact of executive compensation stickiness on investment efficiency is only valid for“rewarding the superior and low punishments on the inferior”compensation contract.Compared with non-state-owned,high-valued and manufacturing companies,the negative relationship is stronger in state-owned,low-valued and non-manufacturing companies.(3)The increase of management power will aggravate the negative impact of executive compensation stickiness on investment efficiency,and the increase of management power will intensify the compensation effect brought by the rent-seeking of power,thereby diluting the sensitivity of compensation rewards and punishments to performance changes.The improvement of financing constraints will weaken the negative impact,which is mainly for under-investment enterprises but not significant for over-investment enterprises.(4)Risk-taking plays an intermediary role between executive compensation stickiness and investment efficiency.Executive compensation stickiness can affect investment efficiency through the channel of risk-taking,which is found effective.