Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies |
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Authors: | Françoise Forges Aviad Heifetz Enrico Minelli |
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Affiliation: | (1) THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, and Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, FRANCE , FR;(2) School of Economics, University of Tel Aviv, Tel Aviv, ISRAEL , IL;(3) Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Università di Brescia, Via San Faustino 74/B,I-25122 Brescia, ITALY (e-mail: minelli@eco.unibs.it) , IT |
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Abstract: | Summary. If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example. Received: August 9, 1999; revised version: September 12, 1999 |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Incentive compatibility General equilibrium Core. |
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