| 全流通环境下投资者利益保护研究——控股股东、中小股东和经理人三方博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐慧玲. 全流通环境下投资者利益保护研究——控股股东、中小股东和经理人三方博弈分析[J]. 财经研究, 2011, 0(11) |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐慧玲 |
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| 作者单位： | 湖北经济学院金融学院;华中科技大学经济学院; |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社科研究青年项目(09YJC790075); 湖北省教育厅科学技术研究青年项目(Q20102201) |
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| 摘 要： | 随着上市公司控制权的转移,投资者保护在全流通环境下有了新的内涵。文章从公司的委托代理问题出发,构建了控股股东、中小股东和经理人的三方博弈模型。各方决策的混合策略纳什均衡结果显示,股权的集中在一定程度上可以抑制公司的内部人控制;为保护投资者利益,应对控股股东和经理人的违规操作进行严厉惩罚,降低投资者的监督稽查成本,健全上市公司的治理机制。
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| 关 键 词： | 股权分置改革 投资者保护 委托代理 纳什均衡 |
Study on Investor Protection under Full Circulation of Stocks:Analysis Based on Tripartite Game among Controlling Shareholders,Minority Shareholders and Managers |
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| XU Hui-ling. Study on Investor Protection under Full Circulation of Stocks:Analysis Based on Tripartite Game among Controlling Shareholders,Minority Shareholders and Managers[J]. The Study of Finance and Economics, 2011, 0(11) |
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| Authors: | XU Hui-ling |
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| Affiliation: | XU Hui-ling1,2 (1.School of Finance,Hubei University of Economics,Wuhan 430205,China,2.School of Economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430074,China) |
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| Abstract: | With the transfer of listed corporate control,investor protection under full circulation of stocks has a new meaning.This paper constructs a model concerning tripartite game among controlling shareholders,minority shareholders and managers from the angle of corporate principal-agent problem.The solution to mixed strategic Nash equilibrium indicates that equity concentration can help to inhibit corporate insider control to some extent;in order to protect the interests of investors,controlling shareholders an... |
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| Keywords: | share-split reform investor protection principal-agent problem Nash equilibrium |
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