为什么大股东选择侵占而不是保护中小股东的权益 |
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引用本文: | 沈坤荣,孙文杰.为什么大股东选择侵占而不是保护中小股东的权益[J].南大商学评论,2006(2). |
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作者姓名: | 沈坤荣 孙文杰 |
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作者单位: | 南京大学商学院经济学系南京大学长三角发展研究中心,南京大学商学院经济学系 |
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基金项目: | 国家社科基金(03BJL026),国家自然科学基金(70473036)资助,国家教育部哲学社会科学创新基地“南京大学经济转型和发展研究中心”子课题“经济增长与结构转型研究”的阶段性成果。 |
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摘 要: | 本文针对我国大股东侵占中小股东权益的普遍现象,通过建立一个理论框架,对大股东与经理合谋共同侵占少数股东权益的机制进行了具体的分析,并结合中国的实际情况,对大股东的选择机制进行了计量检验。实证结果显示,大股东确实通过牟取控制权收益而侵害了少数股东的权益,对经理的监督和激励存在非对称性;公司内部治理状况、监督程度和信息披露水平对大股东和经理的行为模式有非常显著的影响。
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关 键 词: | 大股东 合谋 控制权收益 |
Why do Large Shareholders Encroach on Small Shareholders' Advantage Rather Than Protect Their Advantage |
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Authors: | Shen Kunrong Sun Wenjie |
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Abstract: | This article analyzes the general phenome- non that large shareholders impinge on small share- holders in China,and discusses the choosing mecha- nism of large shareholders collude to the manager and impinge on small shareholders by making a theoretical model,and check the choosing mechanism of large shareholders using the practical data of Chinese cor- porate by quantitative analysis.The conclusion of quantitative analysis shows that,large shareholders rightly have controlling advantages by aggrieving small shareholder's advantages and that monitoring and incentive to the manager is asymmetry,mean- while it manifests that the corporate inside govern- ment,the degree of monitoring and the disclose de- gree of corporate information could exactly affect the behavior of large shareholders and the manager signif- icantly. |
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Keywords: | large shareholders accessory controlling advantage |
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