| 董事会控制权争夺与投资者利益保护——基于可竞争性角度的研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘浩然,宣国良.董事会控制权争夺与投资者利益保护——基于可竞争性角度的研究[J].财经研究,2007,33(5):29-37. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘浩然 宣国良 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052;上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章借鉴产业组织理论关于市场进入问题的可竞争性研究思路,对董事会控制权争夺中投资股东等参与人的非价格竞争行为进行了理论分析,得出董事会均衡格局取决于进入障碍和竞争者能力的结论。由于董事会控制权竞争结构与保护投资者利益有内在联系,因此,文章在得出有关结论的基础上,分析了如何保护中小投资者利益,如何建立健全独立董事制度等问题。
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| 关 键 词： | 董事会控制权 可竞争性 投资者保护 独立董事制度 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-9952（2007）05-0029-09 |
| 收稿时间： | 2007-01-25 |
| 修稿时间： | 2007-01-25 |
Research on the Directorate Control Power Competition and the Investor Benefit Protection Based on the Contestable Theory |
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| LIU Hao-ran,XUAN Guo-liang.Research on the Directorate Control Power Competition and the Investor Benefit Protection Based on the Contestable Theory[J].The Study of Finance and Economics,2007,33(5):29-37. |
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| Authors: | LIU Hao-ran XUAN Guo-liang |
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| Institution: | Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200052, China |
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| Abstract: | By the contestable research ideas of market entry issues in the industrial organization theory,this paper tries to analyze the non-price competition behavior in directorate competition.It concludes that the entry barrier and the competitor strength will determine the directorate equilibrium.On account of the inherent relation between the directorate equilibrium and the investor protection,it discusses the issues about the investor benefit protection and the independent director institution. |
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| Keywords: | directorate control power contestable investor benefit protection independent director institution |
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