Central banks' voting records,the financial crisis and future monetary policy |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Opletalova 26, Prague 1, 110 00, Czech Republic;2. Institute for East and Southeast European Studies, Regensburg, Germany;1. SFI — The Danish National Centre for Social Research, Herluf Trolles Gade 11, DK-1052 København K, Denmark;2. Department of Economics, Lund University, P.O. Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund, Sweden;1. University of Hull, Business School, Cottingham Road, Hull HU6 7RX, UK;2. Tecnológico de Monterrey, EGADE Business School, Mexico;3. University of Bath, Department of Economics, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK;1. University of Palermo, Department of Economics, Business and Statistics (SEAS), Viale delle Scienze, 90128 Palermo, Italy;2. University of Coimbra, Faculty of Economics, Av. Dias da Silva, 165, 3004-512 Coimbra, Portugal;3. University of Minho, Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE), Campus of Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal;4. OECD, Economics Department, 2 rue Andre Pascal, 75775 CEDEX 16 Paris, France;5. University of Minho, Department of Economics, Campus of Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga, Portugal;6. London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Alumni Association, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom;1. European Central Bank, Sonnemannstraße 22, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany;2. Prometeia Associazione, Via Marconi 43, 40122 Bologna, Italy |
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| Abstract: | We examine whether central banks' voting records help predict the future course of monetary policy in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, controlling for financial market expectations. Unlike previous research, we first examine the period of the global financial crisis, characterized by a high level of uncertainty, and second, examine the predictive power of voting records over longer time horizons, i.e., the next monetary policy meeting and beyond. We find that voting records predict the policy rate set at the next meeting in all central banks that are recognized as independent. In some central banks, voting records are found—before, but not during, the financial crisis—to be informative about monetary policy at even more distant time horizons. |
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