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| 医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制 | |
| 引用本文： | 潘常刚,吕国营. 医疗领域的政府干预与声誉机制[J]. 当代经济管理, 2009, 31(10): 56-59 |
| 作者姓名： | 潘常刚 吕国营 |
| 作者单位： | 中南财经政法大学,公共管理学院,湖北,武汉,430060 |
| 基金项目： | 赵曼教授主持的国家自然科学基金资助项目《监管、自律与医生道德风险规避》 |
| 摘 要： | 不确定性和信息不对称常常被认为是医疗市场失灵和政府干预的依据,政府的过度干预又会导致医疗声誉机制的扭曲。改革现行“管办不分”的医疗卫生体制,由市场声誉取代政府行政干预,通过重复博弈建立医生与患者之间的长期稳定的关系,解决医疗卫生领域的难题。 |
| 关 键 词： | 市场失灵 政府干预 声誉机制 重复博弈 |
Government Intervention and Rectification of Reputation Mechanism in Health Care Reform |
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| Pan Changgang,Lv Guoying. Government Intervention and Rectification of Reputation Mechanism in Health Care Reform[J]. Contemporary Economic Management, 2009, 31(10): 56-59 | |
| Authors: | Pan Changgang Lv Guoying |
| Affiliation: | Pan Changgang,Lv Guoying ( School of Public Administration,Zhongnan University of Economics , Law,Wuhan 430060,China) |
| Abstract: | Health care failures are necessary but not sufficient conditions for government intervention. Excessive government intervention will lead to distortion in the medical reputation mechanism. In order to establish a long-term and stable relationship between doctors and patients, rectify the reputation mechanism in health care and resolve the issues of difficulty and high expense in seeing a doctor, it is urgent to reform the current medical and health system in which supervisors are, at the same time, service ... |
| Keywords: | market failure government intervention reputation mechanism repeated games |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |