建设工程业主与承包商招标后合同价格谈判的博弈分析

本文目的在于对业主和承包商在招投标后的合同谈判机理进行研究。对于经过招标的合同谈判，招标活动分两种情况，第一种情况为公开招标，第二种情况为邀请招标。对公开招标，本文指出了垄断性围标对于业主的风险，并且将存在寡头及多头竞争的公开招标并入邀请招标进行研究。在邀请招标情况下，假设业主根据各方报价和技术标得分，选定某一家单位作为合同谈判对象。对在各种信息对称、不对称情况下，对于双方的序贯博弈过程进行分析。

The game analysis of contract price negotiation after bidding between owner and contractor in construction industry

This paper is to study the mechanism for negotiation after the tender between owner and contractor in construction industry. As the contract negotiations after the bidding, the paper devided the bidding into two cases, one is opening, another way is invitation. As the openning way, the paper points out that the monopolized tender will bring the owner a huge risk, and put the oligopoly and free competition into the invitation way to search. As the invitation way, the paper supposes that the owner selected a company to negotiate the contract according to the price and technical score, and analyzes the sequential games by two parts under a variety of information symmetry and asymmetry conditions.