征信体系的作用与效率——基于信息不对称随机有限重复博弈的分析

征信体系的意义可以用重复博弈理论来加以解释.本文建立了一个信息不对称随机有限重复信用博弈模型,证明如果存在征信体系实现的信息共享机制,那么不论借款者的类型是什么,诚实守信是可以作为序列均衡的结果在有限重复博弈的绝大多数时期中出现的.如果不存在信息共享机制,信贷市场有可能消失,即便引入资产抵押,信贷市场仍是不完全的.基于上述序列均衡分析,本文进一步阐释了全面征信、法律保障、市场结构对征信体系效率运行的重要性.就发展中国家而言,成立中性、独立、信息全面的国家信用局和鼓励民营信用公司积极竞争,完善义务征信的法律体系是较为理想和可行的选择

The Role and Efficiency of Credit Reporting System:A Finite Repeated Game-theoretic Analysis with Asymmetric Information

The repeated game theory can be applied to the explanation of the importance of credit reporting system.So based on the model of a finite repeated random game with asymmetric information assumption,the author proves that the cooperative-honesty solution is a sequential equilibrium in the repeated game,no matter what the type of the lender are.Without this information sharing system implemented by credit reporting system,credit market can not persistent as the lack of completeness even with the introduction of collateral.The theoretical analysis show that highly performance of the credit reporting system mainly depends on the scope,the legal infrastructure and the mixed market structure of credit reporting registries.As for developing countries,it is a viable choice in credit reporting system that a neutral,independent,full and comprehensive public credit bureau is build,neutral private credit companies’ competition are encouraged,the obligation of credit reporting are legislated.