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我国经济体制改革中公司治理的委托代理问题
引用本文:李建华,黎文鹏.我国经济体制改革中公司治理的委托代理问题[J].石家庄经济学院学报,2003,26(3):240-243.
作者姓名:李建华  黎文鹏
作者单位:深圳市国潼联房地产评估公司,广东,深圳,51800
摘    要:通过简要分析委托代理问题产生的原因,针对我国国有企业中委托代理关系中存在的问题,重点探讨了解决我国国有企业中委托代理问题的对策:认为在平等与效率兼顾下引入独立董事制度,同时构建约束产权代表与代理行为的双向制衡机制,建立完善有效的激励机制是解决我国国有企业中委托代理矛盾的几项重要措施。

关 键 词:经济体制改革  公司治理  委托代理  激励机制  独立董事  中国
文章编号:1007-6875(2003)03-0240-04
修稿时间:2003年3月11日

The Problem of Trust - agency in Company Administration During Economic System Reform in Our Country
LI Jian-hua,LI Wen-peng.The Problem of Trust - agency in Company Administration During Economic System Reform in Our Country[J].Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics,2003,26(3):240-243.
Authors:LI Jian-hua  LI Wen-peng
Abstract:To solve the optimization problem of enterprise structure during economic system reform, the relationship between trust and agency is an important aspect. This paper briefly analyzed the generating reasons of trust-agency relationship problem. At the same time, it summarized the problems existed in the relationship of trust-agency in state-owned enterprises. The authors focus the discussion on solving the problems of trust-agency relationship. It is considered that enterprises should introduce independent director system while giving attention both equality and efficiency, construct bilateral restrictive balance system to restrict the actions of representatives and agents of the property, establish valid encouragement system. These are important measures to solve the trust-agency relationship problem in state-owned enterprises.
Keywords:trust-agency relationship  bilateral restrictive balance system  encouragement system  independent director
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