More neighbors,more efficiency |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Urology and Nephrology Research Center (UNRC), Department of Urology, Shahid Labbafinejad Medical Center, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran;2. Torfeh General Hospital, Department of Pediatrics, Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran;3. Urology and Nephrology Research Center (UNRC), Shahid Beheshti University of Medical Sciences, Tehran, Iran |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a finite population of agents located within an arbitrary fixed network. Every agent plays a coordination game with his neighbors. If one neighbor's payoff from a specific interaction exceeds his average payoff per interaction, the neighbor is perceived as better performing. Over time agents imitate the strategies of their better performing neighbors; occasionally they make mistakes. Sufficient conditions for emergence of Pareto efficient and risk dominant conventions are provided. The paper also illustrates the main results through relevant examples. |
| |
| Keywords: | Local interaction Coordination game Imitation Contagion |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
