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The consequences of limiting shareholder litigation: Evidence from exclusive forum provisions
Institution:1. Department of Economics and Finance, J. Whitney Bunting College and Business, Georgia College and State University, Milledgeville, GA 31061;2. Department of Finance, Financial Planning, and Insurance, David Nazarian College of Business and Economics, California State University Northridge, Northridge, CA 91330;3. Department of Finance, Spears School of Business, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma 73034
Abstract:In response to an explosion of shareholder litigation, many firms have adopted exclusive forum provisions which limit lawsuits to courts in a firm's state of incorporation. This paper examines the consequences of a required venue for shareholder litigation. Delaware-incorporated companies experience significant increases in firm value around exogenous events that confirmed the use of a specified forum. Reduced legal costs and the designation of the domicile court as the sole forum to hear shareholder claims contribute to the increase in firm value. Overall, these findings suggest that a required venue for shareholder litigation benefits firms by eliminating multi-jurisdictional lawsuits and reducing the threat of claims with little merit.
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