债务违约、社会责任与政府支持

转型期中国，地方国有企业作为地区经济发展的一股中坚力量，当其发生债务违约时，作为实际控制人的地方政府究竟是否愿意提供支持，会优先选择哪些企业提供支持，政府的支持行为是否会影响到信贷资源的配置效率呢?为得到验证，文章选取2007-2016年沪深A股地方国有上市企业作为研究样本，实证分析了地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府的支持行为及其对信贷资源配置效率的影响。研究结论表明：第一，地方国企发生债务违约后，地方政府会提供更多的"支持"，且支持额度与债务违约额呈显著正相关关系；第二，债务违约前，承担了更多社会责任（环保投资、捐赠以及就业等）的地方国企，在债务违约后可相应地获得更多的地方政府支持；第三，违约企业，尤其是得到更多政府支持的违约企业可获得更多的信贷资源，而其经营业绩却往往更差。由此表明政府干预一定程度上降低了信贷资源配置效率。

Debt Default,Social Responsibility and Government Support

In recent years, with the change of domestic and foreign economic environment, the number and scale of corporate debt default has been rising rapidly, and its negative impact on macro and micro economy has become an important problem in theoretical and practical field, especially when it comes to the local state-owned enterprises. The reason lies in that in China, during the transition period, local state-owned enterprises have become a central force of regional economic development. As a result, when they defaults on a debt, will the ultimate controller of the company (refers to the local government) be willing to provide support, if so which enterprises will the government prefer to support, and would the support affect the efficiency of the credit resources allocation, these are important issues. In order to be verified, this paper selects the local state-owned enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as a research sample, empirically analyzes the support behavior of local governments after the default of local state-owned enterprises and its impact on the efficiency of credit resource allocation. We find that:firstly, after the default behavior of the local state-owned enterprises, the local government will provide more "support", and the support levels are significantly positively correlated with the amount of debt default; secondly, if the state-owned enterprises assume more government functions such as employment, donation and investment before debt default, in return, they can obtain more support after debt default; thirdly, defaulting companies, especially those that receive more government support after defaulting, often have more credit resources but tend to underperform. The result shows that government intervention reduces the efficiency of credit resource allocation to a certain extent. The possible contribution of this paper lies in that:Firstly, we expand the economic consequences of corporate debt default research from the perspective of the actual controller of a company. As we know, the economic consequences of debt default and the response of related stakeholders are hot topics in the field of finance research nowadays, and previous studies mainlystudied the consequences of debt default from the perspective of loan banks, defaulting enterprises, auditors, market investors and other stakeholders, however, this paper chooses the actual controller of local state-owned enterprises as our research perspective, and explores the support behavior of local governments after the default of company; Secondly, this paper enriches the relevant literature of shareholder support. Unlike the study of the "tunneling" behavior of controlling shareholders, there are relatively few research results on the "supporting" behavior of controlling shareholders, with only a few studies ranging from mergers and acquisitions (Kee-Hong Bae et al., 2002), associated sales (Jian and Wong, 2010), asset sales and disposal (Peng et al., 2011) and other perspectives have carried out some research on shareholder support behavior, but the study of debt risk, especially the major negative event of debt default, has not been covered yet, and this paper fills this gap; Thirdly, defaulting enterprises which received more government support tend to take up more credit resources, but their performance is often worse, thus indicating that government intervention has exacerbated the mismatch of credit resources to some extent.