腐败控制、私人部门参与基础设施提供与反贫困效应——来自发展中国家的经验证据(1996-2014)

惩治腐败和消除贫困始终是广大发展中国家面临的重要任务。文章基于1996年到2014年138个发展中国家的数据,探索了腐败控制降低一国贫困率的新机制,即促进私人部门参与基础设施提供。我们发现:第一,腐败控制显著促进了私人部门参与基础设施提供;第二,私人部门参与基础设施提供显著降低了发展中国家的贫困率;第三,"中介效应"分析显示,腐败控制是通过促进私人部门参与基础设施提供进而降低一国贫困率的。文章的发现是对发展中国家腐败与贫困关系研究的一个有益补充,不但有助于理解私人部门参与基础设施提供的制度基础,也有助于发展中国家设计反贫困的公共政策。

Control of Corruption,Infrastructure Provision with Private Participation and Anti-Poverty Effect: Evidence from Developing Countries (1996-2014)

International experience shows that, relative to developed countries, the developing countries have a more severe problem of government corruption and also face a higher degree of poverty. As a result, control of corruption and poverty alleviation have always been essential tasks for developing countries. The traditional wisdom proposes several theories to explain the positive relationship between corruption and poverty rate in developing countries, for instance, corruption can impede economic growth and poverty deduction by reducing the return of investment, distorting the structure of public expenditure, or suppressing the incentive of innovation and entrepreneurship. However, this paper proposes a new mechanism, that is, corruption can lower the incentives of pirvite entities to cooperate with government and to take part in infrastructure provision, and thus deteriorates the poverty issue in developing countries. In other words, the improvement in control of corruption helps to alleviate poverty by facilitating private participation in infrastructure provision. Based on the transnational data of 138 developing countries from 1996 to 2014 and a set of econometric models with mediating effect, our paper finds that, firstly, control of corruption significantly promotes private participation in infrastructure provision, which is consistent with Hypothesis A. Specifically, ceteris paribus, one unit standard deviation increase of control of corruption promotes 0.29 percentage of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation. Secondly, infrastructure provision with private participation results in a significant reduction in the poverty rate of developing countries, which lends support for Hypothesis B. More precisely, ceteris paribus, one percentage increase of investment in infrastructure provision with private participation reduces 2.14 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $3.10 a day, or reduces 1.55 percentage of poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day. Thirdly, the analysis of "mediating effect" shows that control of corruption reduces the poverty rate of developing countries through promoting private participation in infrastructure provision, which provides evidence in favor of Hypothesis C. Therefore, this paper makes a beneficial contribution to the related studies investigating the relationship between corruption and poverty of developing countries. It not only gives us a better understanding of the institutional fundamentals of private participation in infrastructure provision in developing world, but also sheds light on the design of anti-poverty policies for China and other developing countries. This paper concludes with the following policy implications, firstly, we should attach more importance to the role of infrastructure construction in poverty alleviation, in order to realize and strengthen its pro-poor and redistributive property. Secondly, we should treat the behaviors of private participation in infrastructure provision rationally, and further develop the comparative advantage of private entities in infrastructure provision. Lastly, we should further enhance the positive social and economic effects of anti-corruption campaign. In summary, this paper is beneficial for China's sustainable development and building a well-off society in an all-round way.