A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports |
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Institution: | 1. RBB Economics, 199 Bishopsgate, London, EC2M 3TY, United Kingdom;2. London School of Economics, Houghton St, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | The centralized sale of TV broadcasting rights in league sports constitutes a cartel which in many European countries is allowed only if it complies with certain conditions set by competition authorities. Two of the most important conditions are: i) partial unbundling, i.e. the rights must be unbundled into several separate packages; and ii) the no-single-buyer rule, i.e. the packages must be sold to different broadcasters. This article shows how a combinatorial auction can be employed to sell broadcasting rights allocating them endogenously based on the broadcasters’ bids and, thus, without requiring the seller to pre-determine the packages of such rights. This feature can address various competition policy issues, including facilitating market entry and preventing coordination among bidders. Also, a combinatorial auction has the potential to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency and higher revenue levels compared to auctions with pre-determined packages of broadcasting rights. |
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Keywords: | Auctions Competition policy League sports Packages TV broadcasting rights |
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