Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior |
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Authors: | Alex Possajennikov |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics (Micro), University of Dortmund, 44221 Dortmund, GERMANY , DE |
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Abstract: | Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
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ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
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ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Evolution Aggregate-taking Aggregative games |
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