水桶定理与高薪养廉 |
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引用本文: | 祝志敏.水桶定理与高薪养廉[J].上海商学院学报,2006,7(1):10-13,60. |
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作者姓名: | 祝志敏 |
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作者单位: | 上海商学院,中国,上海,200235 |
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摘 要: | 本文将“高薪养廉”这一热点问题和管理理论中的需求层次论以及水桶定理很好地结合起来,同时全面分析了腐败产生的制度原因和制度外原因。认为高薪养廉是“防止腐败”这个水桶必不可少的一块木板,但并非惟一的木板,反腐的效果仍需由权力设置、约束机制、监督机制、奖惩制度以及高薪养廉来共同决定。
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关 键 词: | 水桶定理 高薪养廉 廉政 |
文章编号: | 1673-324X(2006)-01-10-13-04 |
修稿时间: | 2006年1月1日 |
The Law of Barrel and High Salary for Clean Government |
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Authors: | Zhu Zhimin |
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Abstract: | This paper attempts to approach the hot issue of " high salary for clean government" from with the law of barrel and Maslow' s hierarchy of needs. It analyzes the causes of corruption as lying within and without the government systems. In the author' s view, if we look upon anti - corruption as a barrel, high salary is just one indispensable board of the barrel. The effects of anti - corruption are also decided by the other boards such as setup of power, mechanism of power restriction, supervision, and rewards and punishment systems. |
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Keywords: | the law of barrel high salary for clean government clean government |
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