Voluntary Export Restraints and Economic Welfare |
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Authors: | Kotaro Suzumura & Jota Ishikawa |
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Institution: | Oxford University and Hitotsubashi University,;Hitotsubashi University |
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Abstract: | In this paper, we explore welfare implications of a voluntary export restraint (VER) agreement within a simple model of duopoly with product differentiation and conjectural variations. We assume that the foreign exporter does not sell its product in its own market and that the imposition of a VER makes the domestic firm into a Stackelberg leader. Under these assumptions, it is shown that a VER introduced at the free-trade equilibrium level of export is welfare-improving for the importing country if and only if the foreign exporter is forced to comply with the restraint involuntarily . In other words, it is impossible to benefit home country and foreign country simultaneously by a VER agreement within the class of models we are envisaging. This result holds irrespective of whether firms compete in terms of quantities or prices. |
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