| Abstract: | This paper examines the macroeconomic implications of two labor-market institutions that play an important role in worker-management interactions: seniority-based layoffs and majority voting on wage proposals. Together, these make the median worker, rather than the marginal worker, the important decision maker for wage and employment outcomes. Since he is risk-averse, he will trade off higher wages for greater security of employment; therefore, the equilibrium level of unemployment will be much less than 50%, but higher than the conventional natural rate of unemployment. Median-worker behavior helps to explain both the greater frequency of excess supply than excess demand (59.4% versus 40.6% of the time since 1890) and the wage concessions of 1981–1983. A new Phillips curve is derived which incorporates systematic influences of the size of the labor force (to correct for the inappropriate measure of excess supply) and Tobin's “q” variable (to measure the risk of unemployment for the median worker). With U.S. data for 1957–1983, this new Phillips curve has a higher explanatory power than the traditional one. Additional forces that influence wages and employment in this setting are identified: firms have an incentive to bargain actively over wages rather than accept union demands passively and senior workers have a “social contract” with junior workers that reduces the extent to which the former exploit the latter. |
