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文化创意产品的版权博弈分析
引用本文:郑文文,陈柳钦.文化创意产品的版权博弈分析[J].经济前沿,2012,3(4):66-71.
作者姓名:郑文文  陈柳钦
作者单位:1. 清华大学科技与社会研究所
2. 中国能源经济研究院发展战略研究中心
摘    要:以人的创造力和知识创新为核心要素的文化创意产业日益成为未来经济增长的动力源泉。在深入了解文化创意产业的内涵及特征的基础上,为促进这一新兴产业更快更好地发展,本文研究了文化创意产业主体之间为占有市场,选择对创意产品采取竞争或激励措施的博弈问题。本文的研究发现:纳什均衡中,文化创意产品的版权博弈双方为了自身收益最大化会独立进行价值投入;斯坦克尔伯格均衡中,版权受让商的价值投入与版权让与商的努力水平成正比,与价值投入成本成反比,双方在纳什均衡条件下投入较少,而各自的均衡期望收益在斯坦克尔伯格均衡条件下更高。

关 键 词:文化创意产业  文化创意产品  价值投入  均衡博弈

VCA Game Theory Equilibrium Analysis for the Main Member of Creative Industry Chain
Institution:ZHENG Wen - wen CHEN Liu - qin
Abstract:The Cultural creative industry becomes the driving force of the future economic advancement, the key element of the creative industry is the human creation and the knowledge innovation. In order to devel- op the Cultural creative industry more well, we ry equilibrium between a copyright assignor and market. Through the game theory equilibrium study the problem of competition or incentive of the game theo- an acceptor who use the method of value investment to hold the analysis, we found that in the condition of Nash equilibrium they will pay for the cost independently to get the max revenue, in the condition of Stackelberg equilibrium, the value investment efforts they take are in the direct ratio relationgship. The money they pay in the Nash e- quilibrium is less than the amount they cost in Stackelberg equilibrium, but they get. more revenue in the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Keywords:cultural creative industry  cultural creative products  value investment  game theory equihbfium
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