财务报告舞弊行政处罚与可感知审计质量

以2001年至2008年间非金融类、非外资类正常交易A股公司为研究样本,考察财务报告舞弊行政处罚是否传递了可感知审计质量信息,实证研究结果表明：投资者总体上并不认可财务报告舞弊行政处罚传递了可感知审计质量信息,仅当投资者观察到反映坏消息的审计意见（如审计师出具非标审计意见、审计意见未改善等）和反映审计师声誉信息（如审计师受到行政处罚）的情况下,投资者才认为财务报告舞弊行政处罚传递了可感知审计质量信息。

Administrative Penalty on Financial Reporting Fraud and Perceived Auditing Quality

Using normally trading A Share Companies from 2001 to 2008 in Chinese capital market which do not belong to finance industry nor issue foreign shares as samples,this paper investigates whether administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud tells the information of perceived auditing quality.The empirical results show that generally investors do not believe administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud tells the information of perceived auditing quality.However,when investors see the bad news such as modified opinion or scandals like auditors＇ administrative penalty,they would believe administrative penalty on financial reporting fraud truly reveals the information of perceived auditing quality.