企业治理之合约安排视角研究

本文基于合约安排的视角对企业治理进行了研究．主要通过激励合约设计．分析代理人剩余分享系数、努力变量、激励变量、努力成本和激励成本等变量之间的相互关系及其经济意义，从而得出了一些主要的基本结论：第一，委托人设计的激励合约具有一定的状态依存性。第二，委托人的监管效率是合约设计的重要因素，且监管本身具有概率性。第三，委托人要关注边际业绩分享系数的作用，进而必须关注“剩余标的”本身的选择。第四，一旦委托人也对产出做出自己的贡献，代理人的风险中立性就不能保证带来最优的结果。第五，委托人“先行一步”的优势是激励合约效率最大化的重要因素。

Research on Governance from Contract Arrangement Perspective

This paper mainly discusses the governance issues from the contract arrangement perspective,which explores the relations among the agents' residual claim parameters,effort variables,incentive variables,effort cost variable and incentive cost variable etc.through the design of the incentive contracts.We make the following conclusions:(1)The incentive contracts have contingent characteristics;(2)Monitoring efficiency is important to design the incentive contracts;(3)The principal must pay attention to the residual itself;(4)The agents' risk-neutral can't always promise to attain the best outcome of the incentive contracts;(5)The principals' first mover advantage is an important factor to achieve the efficiency optimization of the incentive contract.