The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis |
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| Authors: | Christian At Pierre-Henri Morand |
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| Institution: | (1) Université Lumière Lyon II, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique, UMR 5824 du CNRS - 93, chemin des mouilles, 69130 Ecully, FRANCE (e-mail: christian.at@univ-fcomte.fr) , FR;(2) Université de Franche-Comté, CRESE, Avenue de l'observatoire, 25030 Besancon, FRANCE (e-mail: pierre-henri.morand@univ-fcomte.fr) , FR |
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| Abstract: | Summary. This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security
voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants
to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the
opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares.
Received: July 4, 2001; revised version: October 31, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has benefited from a number of comments from the anonymous referees.
Correspondence to: C. At |
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| Keywords: | and Phrases: Security voting structure Auctions Small firms |
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